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COMMENTS
CONVICTION RECORDS As BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT:
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975)
Plaintiff Green, a black man who had served a prison term for
refusing military induction,1 was denied a job as a clerk with defendant
Missouri Pacific Railroad (Mo-Pac) because of Mo-Pac's policy of
refusing employment to persons convicted of crimes other than traffic
violations.2  Green filed suit,3 alleging that defendant's policy was
racially discriminatory in violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 18704 and
1964.1 Upon consideration of plaintiff's statistical evidence, the district
1. Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought conscientious objector status and was convicted in
1967 for failure to report for induction. He sought post conviction review, challenging
the constitutionality of his classification. Relief was denied. Cassidy v. United States,
428 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1970) (at time of conviction, plaintiff's legal name was Cassidy).
2. Defendant's policy of excluding ex-convicts from employment was initiated in
1948, according to defendant's personnel manager, "in reaction to a personnel problem
that then existed." Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 381 F. Supp. 992, 994 (E.D. Mo.
1974), rev'd, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
3. After filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), Green filed suit on November 7, 1972. The EEOC also filed suit
against defendant on April 5, 1973, on the basis of plaintiff's charges. The court
dismissed the EEOC's suit because plaintiff had already filed suit pursuant to an EEOC
"right to sue" notice, thus relegating the EEOC to permissive intervention in the original
suit. EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974).
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
It is well established that the purpose and scope of the 1870 Act are co-extensive with
the fourteenth amendment. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1880); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880) ("mhis Act puts in the form of a statute what
has been substantially ordained by the Constitutional Amendment").
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Act], §§ 701-18,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15
(1970).
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court found that Mo-Pac's rule was not prima facie discriminatory' and
was justified by business necessity.' On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held: Statistical
evidence supports a finding that a blanket rule against hiring ex-
offenders is, prima facie, racially discriminatory, and cannot be justified
by business necessity.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 (Title VII) proscribes
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in hiring, firing, promotion, transfer, salary, and job classification.'0
The use of standardized tests or seniority systems "designed, intended,
or used to discriminate" is forbidden" unless employers demonstrate
that such tests accurately predict job performance ability.12
6. 381 F. Supp. at 996. The district court found jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C.
11343 (1970) and Act § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. IT, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). 381 F. Supp. at 993.
7. The district court's finding that business necessity justified the defendant's hiring
practice was based on its determination that "the state of the art of psychology has not
developed to a degree" that an employer can predict which ex-offenders will be successful
employees. 381 F. Supp. at 997.
8. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975).
9. Act § 701-18, 42 U.S.C. H§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970). "Unlawful employment practices" are defined and
enumerated in Act §§ 703-04, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 (Supp. IT, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 took effect on July 2, 1964,
except for Title VII, which became effective a year later in order to give employers a
grace period in which to comply voluntarily with its provisions.
10. Act §§ 703-04, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 (Supp. 1I, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C.
1§ 2000e-2, -3 (1970). An aggrieved employee may sue his employer in federal court.
Act § 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (1970). The Act empowers federal courts to grant broad equitable relief and to enjoin
the use of an unlawful employment practice "[i]f the court finds that the respondent
employer has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful
employment practice . . . ." Act § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972),
amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
11. Act § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Act § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1970) makes an exception for discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin (but not race or color) when such a characteristic "is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of that particular business enterprise."
12. E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-
.14 (1970). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established by
Act § 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970),
is authorized to issue regulations for the construction of Title VII, and is charged with its
enforcement. The EEOC guidelines require that any test having an adverse impact on
minorities be validated for job relatedness and that the employer show that there are no
less discriminatory tests available.
The guidelines define "employment tests" as
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I Until 1971, the most difficult cases that arose under Title VII
involved "facially neutral" employment requirements such as high
school diplomas or minimum scores on standardized tests. When such
employment practices had disproportionate adverse effects on minori-
ties, some courts held them unlawful only if adopted with an intent to
discriminate;13 other courts rejected any practice with discriminatory
effects not justified by "business necessity."' 4
all formal, scored, quantified, or standardized techniques of assessing job
suitability including ... specific qualifying or disqualifying personal history
or background requirements, specific educational or work history requirements,
scored interviews, biographical information blanks, interviewers' rating scales,
scored application forms, etc.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1970). The guidelines further provide that
[tihe use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer, or
any other employment . . . of classes protected by title VII constitutes dis-
crimination unless: (a) the test has been validated and evidences a high degree
of utility ...and (b) . . . alternative suitable hiring, transfer, or promotion
procedures are unavailable ...
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1970). According to the guidelines, appropriate validation must
include empirical evidence developed in accordance with minimum standards governing
representative samples, controlled test conditions, and scoring and reporting of test
results. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1970). In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), the Supreme Court endorsed these validation requirements. The Court's recent
decision in Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), however,
suggests that the Court may re-evaluate Albemarle and withdraw its approval of the
EEOC's validation requirements in future Title VII cases. See id. at 4795 & n.17;
4798-800 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 24 infra.
13. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 116 (N.D. Ala.
1968); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413, 446 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
14. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D. La. 1969) (holding intent
irrelevant without discussing business necessity).
The content of this court-made business necessity test varied from case to case. See
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 954 (1971) ("essential to the safe and efficient operation of the company's
business"); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (standardized
tests that are "unrelated to the job to be performed are just as reasonably a prerequisite
to hiring and promotion as is a high school diploma," quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
292 F. Supp. 243, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1968)); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp.
413, 446 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (reasonable economic purpose); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
292 F. Supp. 243, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) ("Nowhere does
the Act require . . . only those tests which measure the ability and skills required of a
particular job. . ").
The first guidelines published by the EEOC equated business necessity with job
relatedness. See Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, 2 CCH EMPL. PRtAc.
GumE 116,904 (1967).
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In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'5 the Supreme Court resolved the
issue by holding that Title VII prohibits all apparently neutral practices
with racially discriminatory consequences, regardless of the employer's
intent."0 "Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups . . . . 17 A state census
revealing that 34 percent of white males, compared with 12 percent
of black males, complete high school underlay the Court's conclusion
that the challenged high school diploma requirement was prima facie
discriminatory."' The Court then held that business necessity was the
sole justification for allowing an employer to retain the requirement:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job per-
formance, the practice is prohibited.
[C]ongress has placed on the employer the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.1 9
Courts have interpreted Griggs as requiring a liberal construction of
Title VII and, buttressed by statistics,20 have found several widely used
15. 401 U.S. 424 (1971), noted in 6 GA. L. REV. 194 (1971), 47 NOTR DA.M
LAw. 381 (1971), and25 Sw. L.J. 484 (1971).
16. The Supreme Court noted:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are
fair in form but discriminatory in operation ....
, * .Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation.
401 U.S. at 431, 432 (emphasis original).
17. Id. at 431.
18. Id. at 430 n.6.
19. Id. at 431-32. The Court further held that "[wihat Congress has commanded is
that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract." Id. at 436.
20. See Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1975);
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 53 (5th Cir. 1974); Afro-American
Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 299 (6th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians,
Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1335-36 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1973); Rock v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344, 1346-48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973); Spurlock
v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973);
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
906 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert.
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and superficially "innocent" employment practices to be racially dis-
criminatory. 21 Employers must meet stringent standards to demon-
strate business necessity. 22 Although several courts have held that job
performance ability is the only relevant criterion,2 3 the Supreme Court
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426
(8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); United States v. City of Chicago,
385 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also Note, Employment Discrimination:
Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463, 468-72 (1973).
21. One such "innocent" employment practice held invalid is the requirement of a
high school diploma. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); John-
son v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 918 (5th Cir. 1973); Broussard v. Schlum-
berger Well Serv., 315 F. Supp. 506, 512 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also note 18 supra and
accompanying text. Similarly, courts have struck down rules requiring dismissal from
employment for wage garnishments, Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th
Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1971), noted it
85 HAuv. L. REv. 1482 (1972), and 37 Mo. L. REv. 705 (1972), and minimum scores on
standardized tests. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Brito
v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power
Co. supra at 917.
22. See Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1974);
Waters v. International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th Cir. 1974); Wallace v.
Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp.,
493 F.2d 191, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Soc'y of New York Fire Dept. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 393-98 (2d Cir. 1973); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354,
366 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912-14 (5th
Cir. 1973); Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344, 1349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 933 (1973); United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 588 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 662-64 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543,
557 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017,
1021-22 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Chesterfield
County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1973); Brito v. Zia, 478 F.2d 1200, 1205
(10th Cir. 1973).
The business necessity test articulated in Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Ci.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), is representative of the standard applied
by most courts:
[A]n overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary
to the safe and efficient operation of the business. . . . inhere must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better
accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with
a lesser differential racial impact.
For general discussion of the business necessity test, see Comment, Title VII:
Discriminatory Results and the Scope of Business Necessity, 35 LA. L. REv. 646 (1974);
Note, Fair Employment Practices: The Concept of Business Necessity, 3 MEMPHIS ST.
L. REv. 76 (1972); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
23. In Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal, 1971), the court noted
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has yet to determine the precise scope of the business necessity
defenseY
Hiring policies based on arrest records have been successfully
challenged under Title VII. 25 The legality of conviction records as
blanket disqualifications from employment, however, had not been
that expense and inconvenience were the primary justifications the employer offered for
its rule requiring dismissal for wage garnishments and held:
[11n light of the Supreme Court's definition of business necessity, they are not
sufficient. The sole permissible reason for discriminating against actual or
prospective employees involves the individual's capability to perform the job
effectively. This approach leaves no room for arguments regarding incon-
venience, annoyance, or even expense to the employer.
Id, at 495.
Cases holding that business necessity means only "ability to do the job" have been
criticized in Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations
on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844,
850-51 (1972), and 85 HIv. L. REv. 1482 (1972).
24. Compare Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), with
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Davis, like Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (see notes 31-33 infra),
was not a Title VII action. The plaintiffs in Davis alleged that an employment test
measuring verbal ability, administered by the District of Columbia Police Department,
was racially discriminatory in violation of the fifth amendment due process clause and a
District of Columbia statute. Defendants argued, however, that the Civil Service Act, 5
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1) (1970), incorporated the Griggs test of job relatedness, with which
they had complied. The Court's agreement with this contention, Washington v. Davis,
supra at 4795, implies disapproval of the EEOC standards adopted in Albemarle Paper;
the evidence of validity presented to the district court failed to meet those standards. 44
U.S.L.W. at 4796-800 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the district court's finding, approved by the Court, was that the test was
sufficiently job related because it "directly related to the determination of whether the
applicant possesses sufficient skills to fulfill the demands of the curriculum a recruit must
master at the police academy." Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C.
1972). This finding is inconsistent with prior Title VII cases, which required that a test
adequately predict job performance rather than success in job training. But the Court
flatly rejected the reasoning of these cases:
[TIhat training-program validation may itself be sufficient is supported by
regulations of the Civil Service Commission . ... Nor is the conclusion
foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; . .. and it
seems to us the much more sensible construction of the job relatedness-re-
quirement.
44 U.S.L.W. at 4795.
The district court also applied Title VII standards to challenges of discrimination
under the due process clause, see note 32 infra, a procedure the Court explicitly
disapproved. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4794.
25. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1971), noted in 32
U. Pirr. L. REV. 254 (1971), and 6 HARv. Civ. RwIHTs-CIv. LiB. L. Rav. 165 (1970).
The employer was enjoined "from seeking from applicants for employment. .. informa-
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directly addressed prior to Green.26  One court rejected a Title VII
challenge to an employer's dismissal of a hotel bellman after learning
of his prior theft convictions.21 That decision, however, was based on
the "security-sensitive" nature of plaintiff's job, and the employer's
offer of a job that did not present opportunities for theft, at a compar-
able wage.28  The Supreme Court upheld an employer's refusal to
rehire an employee who had been convicted of illegal activity directed
against the employer in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,20 but sug-
gested in dicta that "a sweeping disqualification of all those with any
past record of unlawful behavior" would be invalid. 0 In Carter v.
Gallagher,"' the Eighth Circuit considered the validity of convictions as
a bar to hiring, in a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866
tion concerning their prior arrest records which did not result in conviction." Id. at 404
(emphasis added).
26. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion
of constitutional challenges to conviction records as barriers to public employment, see
United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Carr v. Thompson,
384 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa
1974); 6 HARv. Civ. RiGHTS-CIV. Lm. L. Rav. 165 (1970).
27. Richardson v. Hotel Corp., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Id. at 521.
29. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30. Id. at 806. The Court found that "[niothing in Title VII compels an employer
to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against
it." Id. at 804. Justice Powell's majority opinion stated:
We need not consider or decide here whether, or under what circumstances,
unlawful activity not directed against the particular employer may be a legiti-
mate justification for refusing to hire.
Id. at 803 n.17.
When plaintiff stressed the "job relatedness" issue from Griggs, the Court noted that
the Griggs reasoning was inapplicable because
petitioner does not seek his [plaintiff's] exclusion on the basis of a testing de-
vice which overstates what is necessary for competent performance or through
some sweeping disqualification of all those with any past record of unlawful
behavior, however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal
qualifications as an employee.
Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
31. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The suit, a
class action against the Minneapolis Fire Department, alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970) and the fourteenth amendment. At that time defendant, a municipal
governmental entity, was not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. Act §
701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. H9 2000e(a), (b) (Supp.
II, 1972). State and local governments are no longer exempted from the Act. Act §
701(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b) (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. H9
2000e(b) (1970).
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rather than Title VII. The court nevertheless employed Title VII
standards32 and required the employer to revise its rules so that con-
viction would not absolutely bar employment.33  The precise question
whether a blanket rule against hiring ex-offenders is racially discrimina-
tory, or whether such a rule is justified by business necessity, remained
undecided.
In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,"4 plaintiff's statistical evidence
of racial discrimination 33 demonstrated that in urban areas, blacks are
32. The Carter court focused primarily on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). 452 F.2d at 324-26. The application of Title VII standards to an equal
protection claim was discredited by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 44
U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), discussed in note 24 supra. The Court ruled in
Davis that proof of racially discriminatory purpose is necessary to establish an equal
protection violation, and that the "more rigorous" Title VII standards are not applicable
to constitutional claims of racial discrimination:
[E]mployees or applicants proceeding under iTitle VII] need not concern
themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead
focus solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or
promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held
that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial
discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today.
Id. at 4792
33, In Carter, the trial court had ordered that:
(i) no person will be rejected as an applicant for the position of fire
fighter with the Minneapolis Fire Department by reason of the conviction
of any felony or felonies at any time prior to five years from the date of
application or by reason of the conviction of any misdemeanor or misde-
meanors at any time prior to two years from the date of application ...
' * . (ii) no person will be rejected . . . by reason of the conviction of
any felony, misdemeanor, or other criminal act, or the conviction of felonies,
misdemeanors, or other criminal acts, except upon a written finding by the
Civil Service Commission after notice to the applicant and an opportunity to
respond in person or in writing that the act or acts upon which such convic-
tions were based, considering the circumstances in which it occurred, involve
behavior from which it can reasonably be inferred that such applicant cannot
adequately fulfill the duties of a fire fighter ....
452 F.2d at 320. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit modified the trial court's order; the
employer was required to revise its rules so that conviction would not absolutely bar
employment, but the court "would not consider any rule giving fair consideration to the
bearing of the conviction upon the applicant's fitness for the . . . job to be inappro-
priate." Id. at 326. See also Wilson, supra note 23, at 849-50.
34. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
35. Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit limited the statistical analysis to a
demonstration of how Mo-Pac's policy affected blacks and whites in the metropolitan St.
Louis area, paying particular attention to its effect upon blacks who had applied for
employment with Mo-Pac.
Proof of discrimination against minorities has been buttressed by statistical evidence
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convicted of crimes at a rate two to three times greater than the per-
centage of blacks in the population. 0 The additional proof that
defendant's policy against hiring ex-offenders excluded a significantly
greater proportion of black than white applicants3 7 convinced the court
that Green had established a prima facie case of discrimination. 8
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not explicitly
determined the validity of conviction records as hiring considera-
tions, but noted the implication of McDonnell Douglas"0 that a blan-
ket disqualification based on past convictions would be disapproved
when it has a disparate racial impact.40 Mo-Pac defended its hiring
that shows: 1) that the questioned employment practice will automatically exclude a
higher proportion of minority workers than white workers in a particular geographical
area; 2) that the racial composition of defendant's workforce, compared to the racial
composition of the geographical area, reflects discriminatory employment practices; or
3) that the questioned employment practice has in fact excluded more minority employ-
ees than whites at the defendant's company. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d
1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MiCH. L. Rnv. 59
(1973); Note, supra note 20, at 463.
36. 523 F.2d at 1294.
37. Id. at 1294-95.
38. Id. at 1295. The district court, considering the same statistics, had found that
conviction records disqualified 5.3 percent of black applicants, compared to 2.23 percent
of white applicants, for employment at Mo-Pac. The district court went on to compare
the number of blacks rejected for convictions to the total number of applicants. This
further computation resulted in a finding that 2.05 percent of all applicants were blacks
with conviction records, and 1.4 percent of all applicants were white ex-convicts. Holding
that these figures did not prove discrimination, the district court stated:
A comparison of the 2.05% . . . with the 16% (percentage of blacks in the
St. Louis metropolitan area in 1970) shows that the percentage of blacks
adversely affected by the subject hiring policies is not disproportionately large
when compared with the percentage of blacks in the subject population. The
2.05% figure shows a de minimis discriminatory effect against blacks with
conviction records ....
381 F. Supp. at 996. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court's statistical
analysis was erroneous because the 2.05 percent figure "dilutes the actual discriminatory
impact against blacks," and "does not reflect a disparity of impact separately against
each race." 523 F.2d at 1295. The Eighth Circuit also held that comparing the
percentage of black applicants with conviction records with the percentage of blacks in
the metropolitan area was incorrect, since
[t]he issue to be examined statistically is whether the questioned employment
practice operates in a disparate manner upon a minority race or group, not
whether the individuals actually suffering from a discriminatory practice are
statistically large in number.
Id.
39. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See notes 29-30
supra and accompanying text.
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policy by arguing that ex-offenders lack moral character, cannot be
bonded, expose the employer to tort liability for hiring a person with
"known violent tendencies," have unstable employment records be-
cause of recidivism, and increase the risk of cargo theft. The court
found these justifications insufficient to support Mo-Pac's use of convic-
tion records as an absolute bar to employment and inadequate to satisfy
its burden of proving business necessity. 41
The court's treatment of statistical evidence in Green was consistent
with the use of such evidence by other courts.4 2 The statistics indicated
that Mo-Pac's policy "operated automatically to exclude from employ-
ment 53 of every 1000 black applicants but only 22 of every 1000 white
applicants,"' a rejection rate almost two and one-half times greater for
blacks than for whites. The court correctly rejected the district court's
comparison of the percentage of disqualified black applicants to the
percentage of blacks in the relevant labor pool. A substantially dis-
parate racial impact establishes discrimination, not proof that "the
individuals actually suffering from a discriminatory practice are statisti-
cally large in number. '4 4  The court appropriately found that the
discriminatory impact of Mo-Pac's rule was "substantial."45
Although it is conceptually difficult to see the racial discrimination
inherent in Mo-Pac's policy, since the rule more obviously "discrimin-
ates against both blacks and whites on the basis of their criminal
records,' '46 a contrary finding would have departed from the Title VII
40. 523 F.2d at 1294.
41. Id. at 1297-98.
42. See cases cited note 20 supra.
43. 523 F.2d at 1294-95.
44. Id. at 1295.
45. Whether the discrimatory impact of a challenged employment practice is "sub-
stantial" is a factual determination. The racial composition of the relevant labor market
varies from case to case, as does the number of minority group members who possess the
requisite occupational skills. The courts, therefore, have remained flexible, and have not
"identified precisely the showing required to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant." Note, supra note 20, at 478. See 1974-1975 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. INn. & COM. L. REv. 965, 1080-
86 (1975) (general discussion of burden of proof in Title VII cases).
46. 523 F.2d at 1300, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Gibson, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Judge Gibson, joined by Judges Stephenson and Henley, found that
the disparate effect of Mo-Pac's policy on blacks was de minimis, that the rule
prohibiting hiring ex-offenders was not racially discriminatory, and that
Title VII should be construed in a manner to preserve the employers' right to
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standards established in Griggs and adopted by many post-Griggs
cases.417  Absent business necessity, Title VII analysis does not permit
distinction between conviction records and high school diploma require-
ments or wage garnishment rules, previously found to be racially
discriminatory. 4
As the employer's sole defense, the scope of business necessity is
crucial. Unfortunately, however, the court's brief consideration of the
business necessity defense did not explain what justifications are rele-
vant to business necessity. While purporting to apply the business
necessity test previously adopted by the Eighth Circuit,40 the Green
court summarily condemned Mo-Pac's rule for overbreadth, rather than
discussing its justifications in light of the test:
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically
place every individual convicted of any offense ...in the permanent
ranks of the unemployed.5 0
The effect of the Green decision on efficiency in hiring and business
operation is unclear. The court limited its holding by noting that the
reasons underlying Mo-Pac's practice "can serve as relevant considera-
tions in making individual hiring decisions," 51 but did not suggest how
a valid rule implementing those considerations should be fashioned. It
is possible that the burden placed on employers will be minimal, if they
may simply specify those jobs for which persons convicted of certain
make reasonable business judgments in these matters based upon the exigencies
of the particular business.
Id. at 1300.
47. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 18 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
49. United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973), quoting Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971):
Mhis doctrine of business necessity, which has arisen as an exception to the
amenability of discriminatory practices, "connotes an irresistible demand."
The system in question must not only foster safety and efficiency, but must
be essential to that goal .... In other words, there must be no acceptable
alternative that will accomplish that goal "equally well with a lesser differential
racial impact." (emphasis original).
See note 22 supra.
50. 523 F.2d at 1298.
51. Id. The court noted that the EEOC guidelines, see note 12 supra, apply not
only to standardized tests, but also to background requirements like that challenged in
Green. The court deemed it unnecessary, however, to decide whether the defendant
would have to comply with the guidelines in modifying its hiring practices with respect to
conviction records. Id. at 1299 n.13.
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crimes may never be hired. For example, the employer could decide
that no one convicted of theft is eligible for jobs demanding easy access
to funds, cargo, or valuable equipment. If, on the other hand, the
employer must determine the "nature and seriousness of [each appli-
cant's] crime in relation to the job sought, . . . the time elapsing since
the conviction, the degree of rehabilitation, and the circumstances
under which the crime was committed,"52 the time and expense
involved in personnel decisionmaking will be increased substantially."3
The business world will probably look upon this decision as another
example of courts "forcing employers to pay for society's shortcom-
ings."" To the extent that the courts allow employers discretion to
decide which crimes are job related, however, a sacrifice of business
efficiency is unlikely. Criminologists, on the other hand, will probably
applaud judicial elimination of blanket rules against hiring ex-
offenders, since inability to obtain employment is considered a major
cause of recidivism.5 Recognizing that few employers will voluntarily
"assume the risk" of hiring ex-offenders,56 several states have recently
enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against ex-offenders by private
and public employers. 57  Acceptance of the Green analysis in future
Title VII cases, coupled with this trend of state laws, would
vastly improve employment possibilities for both white and black
ex-offenders. 58
52. Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 581 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
53. The time involved in the hiring decision is increased because the employer must
thoughtfully consider, rather than summarily reject, the applications of what may be a
substantial number of ex-offenders. Evidence in Green showed that 292 ex-offenders
applied for jobs at Mo-Pac's general office in St. Louis from September 1, 1971, to
November 7, 1973, 174 of whom were black. 523 F.2d at 1294.
54. Wilson, supra note 23, at 851.
55. See Note, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination
Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HAST. L.J. 1403, 1404-08 (1975).
56. See Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 COnNELL L REV. 306, 307
(1970); Note, Employment Discrimination Against Rehabilitated Drug Addicts, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 67, 68 (1974).
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.011 (Supp. 1974) (excepting prior convictions of felony
or first degree misdemeanor "directly related" to the job sought); HAwAII REv. STAT. §
378-2(1) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.96A.020 (Supp. 1974). See Note,
supra note 55, at 1426-31.
58. Even absent a state law prohibiting employment discrimination against ex-
offenders, white ex-offenders may benefit from the Title VII analysis set forth in Green.
Clearly, the modifications required in Mo-Pac's hiring policy will benefit future appli-
cants of all races. For example, Mo-Pac may not simply retain its ex-offender policy for
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all applicants except blacks; any white ex-offender applicant would then have a Title VII
action against Mo-Pac for overtly discriminatory hiring policies.
Additionally, in response to Green, other employers may alter their rules against
hiring ex-offenders to avoid Title VII litigation, thus similarly benefiting white cx-
offenders. Blanket rules against hiring ex-offenders which are not voluntarily changed,
however, would probably require initial challenge by a member of a minority group,
because the statistical "adverse impact" necessary to show discrimination does not exist
for a white ex-convict. If a broad view of "standing" were adopted in Title VII cases,
however, whites might be able to challenge racially discriminatory practices. This
theory is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), which held that white residents of a housing project had
standing to challenge a landlord's racially discriminatory rental policies. For a more
thorough discussion, see Note, Employment Discrimination Against Rehabilitated Drug
Addicts, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 67, 72-73 (1974).
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